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he development of oil, natural gas, and hydropower has made 
title to the beds and banks underlying navigable waters 
increasingly valuable. Whether such title belongs to the federal 
T 
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government or to an individual state depends on navigability for 
title—the principle that upon entry into the Union, states gained title 
to the beds and banks underlying navigable-for-title waters within 
their borders. If a waterway is navigable for title, then title passes 
from the federal government to the state; if not, title remains with the 
federal government. While this principle seems straightforward, 
recent litigation reveals a deeper complexity and a striking lack of 
clear precedent on how navigability for title is to be determined. 
The litigation history surrounding navigability for title is relatively 
sparse.
1
 Major questions about the application of the navigability-for-
title test seemed, until recently, hopelessly muddled. On February 22, 
2012, the U.S. Supreme Court answered the fifty-million-dollar 
question of how to apply the navigability-for-title test in PPL 
Montana, LLC v. Montana (“PPL II”).
2
 The difference in outcome 
between that case and the lower court’s ruling in PPL Montana, LLC 
v. State (“PPL I”) exposes the confusion and ambiguity surrounding 
the test for navigability.
3
 In PPL I, the Montana Supreme Court 
considered whether the navigability-for-title test applied segment by 
segment or in consideration of the river’s overall susceptibility to 
 
* J.D. Candidate  2013, University of Oregon School of Law; B.A. Environmental Studies 
and English, 2009, Lewis & Clark College. I am thankful for the love and support of my 
parents and brothers.  Further thanks are owed for the guidance and encouragement of my 
many professors and colleagues, particularly Professor Mary Wood and Joe Bushyhead, in 
the preparation of this Note.      
1 While waters found navigable for title may be subject to the public trust doctrine, 
navigable-for-title waters have surprisingly been a generally uncontroversial issue. Public 
trust doctrine scholars continue to argue heatedly about the extent of the public trust, but 
the question of whether navigable waterways are held in trust is rarely contested. See 
generally Michael C. Blumm & Thea Schwartz, Mono Lake and the Evolving Public Trust 
in Western Water, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 701, 708—09 (1995) (arguing the litigation 
surrounding Mono Lake significantly expanded the scope of the public trust “beyond 
navigable water to reach nonnavigable tributaries that affect navigable waters”); James L. 
Huffman, Speaking of Inconvenient Truths—A History of the Public Trust Doctrine, 18 
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1, 9 (2007) (contending that precedent does not support an 
expansion of the public trust doctrine); Jack Tuholske, Trusting the Public Trust: 
Application of the Public Trust Doctrine to Groundwater Resources, 9 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 
189, 193 (2008) (arguing that the public trust extends to groundwater resources in addition 
to the traditionally held lands beneath navigable waters).   
2 PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana (PPL II), 132 S. Ct. 1215 (2012); Robert Barnes, Lewis 
and Clark and Roberts and Alito: Montana Case Asks Court to Interpret 1805 Expedition, 
THE WASHINGTON POST (Nov. 27, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/lewis   
-and-clark-and-roberts-and-alito-montana-case-asks-court-to-interpret-1805-expedition 
/2011/11/26/gIQAT37r2N_story.html (noting the fifty million dollar estimate of liability 
includes interest since the forty-one million dollar Montana Supreme Court decision). 
3 PPL Mont., LLC v. State (PPL I), 229 P.3d 421, 426 (Mont. 2010), cert. granted in part, 
131 S. Ct. 3019 (2011), and rev’d and remanded, 132 S. Ct. 1215 (2012). 
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commerce,
4
 ultimately ruling for the latter proposition.
5
 The U.S. 
Supreme Court, however, announced that the Montana Supreme 
Court’s decision “was based upon an infirm legal understanding of 
this Court’s rules of navigability for title under the equal-footing 
doctrine”
6
 and unanimously held that the test must be applied 
segment by segment.
7
 
This Note discusses the recent litigation surrounding PPL Montana 
and the application of the navigability-for-title test. Part I provides a 
brief overview of the background of navigability-for-title law, 
including the equal-footing doctrine, navigability in fact, the Daniel 
Ball test,
8
 and United States v. Utah.
9
 Part II summarizes the Montana 
Supreme Court’s holding in PPL I with a focus on the navigability 
issue. Part III reviews the broad issues and precedent through the 
parties’ briefs leading up to PPL I and PPL II. Part IV analyzes the 
recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in PPL II. Finally, Part V 
identifies possible holes in the Court’s opinion, surmising that the 
correct application of the navigability-for-title test may not be as 
“well settled” as the Court indicates.
10
 
I 
THE NAVIGABILITY-FOR-TITLE TEST 
The confusion over navigability for title is understandable in light 
of the wide range of law needed to comprehend the deceptively 
simple-sounding navigability-for-title test; a chronological overview 
of the history of navigability for title thus follows. Part I discusses the 
following: (1) what constitutes navigability for title; (2) the 
controversial public trust doctrine, with roots in ancient Roman law, 
and the subsequent adoption of this principle in English common law; 
(3) the adoption into the U.S. Constitution of a part of the English 
common law regarding navigable waters through the equal-footing 
doctrine; (4) the Daniel Ball test, which determines which waters the 
equal-footing doctrine includes;
11
 (5) United States v. Utah’s 
 
4 Id. at 438. 
5 Id. at 449. 
6 PPL II, 132 S. Ct. at 1235. 
7 Id. at 1229. 
8 The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870). 
9 United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 71 (1931). 
10 PPL II, 132 S. Ct. at 1229. 
11 The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. at 563. 
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application of the Daniel Ball test;
12
 and (6) a summary of the 
ensuing confusion over the different types of navigability and the 
various navigability tests. 
A.  From Ancient Roman Law to the English Crown 
The Roman Emperor Justinian voiced the principle that the public 
possesses inviolable rights to certain natural resources, including 
navigable water. “By the law of nature these things are common to 
mankind—the air, running water, the sea, and consequently the shores 
of the sea.”
13
 Justinian further stated that “rivers and ports are public; 
hence the right of fishing in a port, or in rivers, is common to all 
men.”
14
 This ancient principle is thought to lay the groundwork for 
the present-day public trust doctrine
15
 and the subdoctrine of 
navigability-for-title law. 
The common law courts of England later adopted the Justinian 
doctrine of a public right to use certain waters. A U.S. court 
summarized this transition as follows: 
For centuries, land below the low water mark has been recognized 
as having a peculiar nature, subject to varying degrees of public 
demand for rights of navigation, passage, portage, commerce, 
fishing, recreation, conservation and aesthetics. Historically, no 
developed western civilization has recognized absolute rights of 
private ownership in such land as a means of allocating this scarce 
and precious resource among the competing public demands. 
Though private ownership was permitted in the Dark Ages, neither 
Roman Law nor the English common law as it developed after the 
signing of the Magna Charta would permit it.
16
 
English courts continued the doctrine by noting “title in the soil of 
the sea, or of arms of the sea, or below ordinary high-water mark, is 
in the King” and is “held subject to the public right.”
17
 
  
 
12 United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 71 (1931). 
13 THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN 158 (Thomas Collett Sandars trans., Callaghan & Co., 
5th ed. 1876) (c. 533 B.C.E.). 
14 Id. 
15 Lawrence v. Clark County, 254 P.3d 606, 608 (Nev. 2011).  
16 United States v. 1.58 Acres of Land Situated in the Commonwealth, 523 F. Supp. 
120, 122–23 (D. Mass. 1981) (citation omitted). 
17 Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 13 (1894). 
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B.  America’s Adoption of the Public Right to Waters Through the 
Equal-Footing Doctrine 
As legal successors to the English king, American colonies took 
ownership of submerged land beneath navigable waters.
18
 Thus, the 
original thirteen colonies received rights to the beds and banks 
beneath their navigable waters to be held for the public.
19
 This right 
was later extended to new states upon entering the Union under the 
equal-footing doctrine.
20
 
While the original thirteen colonies took ownership of such beds 
and banks when the Union was established, the federal government 
held title to the remaining beds and banks in trust for the future 
states.
21
 Upon admittance into the Union, a new state took title to the 
lands beneath its navigable waters from the federal government.
22
 
Thus, the new state entered the Union on equal footing with the 
original states.
23
 The U.S. Supreme Court has emphasized that such 
land is valuable for public purposes and cannot be routinely alienated 
from state ownership.
24
 
Notably, the American pronouncements of the English common 
law doctrine differ in one important respect. The English Crown held 
rights to navigable tidal waters, whereas states took title to all 
navigable waters. The U.S. Supreme Court noted and explained this 
distinction in 1988.
25
 The Court reflected on the different topography 
of America and the “thousands of miles of public navigable water[s]   
. . . in which there is no tide” and concluded this fact required 
“jurisdiction [be] made to depend upon the navigable character of the 
water, and not upon the ebb and flow of the tide.”
26
 Thus, while the 
 
18 Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892). 
19 Sidney F. Ansbacher, Stop the Beach Renourishment: A Case of MacGuffins and 
Legal Fictions, 35 NOVA L. REV. 587, 626–27 (2011) (discussing the origin of American 
navigability for title). 
20 Shively, 152 U.S. at 49–50; Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 222–23, 228–30 
(1845). 
21 Pollard, 44 U.S. at 228–29. 
22 Id. at 216; Shively, 152 U.S. at 49–50. 
23 Shively, 152 U.S. at 49–50.  
24 Id. 
25 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 478 (1988).  
26 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting The Genesee Chief, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 457 
(1851), superseded by statute, Extension of Admirality Jurisdiction Act of 1948, 46 U.S.C. 
§ 740 (1948), as recognized in Exec. Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249 
(1972).  
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equal-footing doctrine derives from English common law, the 
doctrine has expanded to all navigable waters. 
C.  The Daniel Ball Test 
The Daniel Ball test determines which waters are navigable for 
title and thus which waters pass to the state under the equal-footing 
doctrine. Whether a waterway is navigable for title is a question of 
federal law.
27
 In The Daniel Ball, the United States sued the owners 
of a steam ship for violating a law requiring the inspection and 
licensing of ships transporting passengers or cargo over navigable 
waters of the United States.
28
 The ship had not been inspected or 
licensed in its travels over Michigan’s Grand River between the 
Grand Rapids and Grand Haven.
29
 The U.S. Supreme Court 
considered whether the ship operated on a navigable water of the 
United States.
30
 The Court concluded that the Grand River was 
navigable because it was navigable in fact,
31
 and a river is navigable 
in fact when it is capable of being used for commerce.
32
 Further, the 
Court established a “test” to determine which rivers are navigable in 
fact. Rivers are navigable in fact when they are (1) used or susceptible 
to being used (2) in their ordinary condition (3) as a highway for 
commerce (4) in the customary modes of trade and travel (5) at the 
time of statehood.
33
 Although the Daniel Ball test originally applied 
only to rivers, it has since been applied to all watercourses.
34
 
Four years after establishing the Daniel Ball test, the U.S. Supreme 
Court applied and clarified the test in The Montello.
35
 The Montello 
Court considered whether the Fox River in Wisconsin was a 
navigable water of the United States.
36
 Rapids and falls once filled 
the Fox River but were subsequently eliminated by locks, canals, and 
dams,
37
 allowing commerce to proceed.
38
 Based on that fact, the 
 
27 United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14 (1935).  
28 The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 558–59 (1870). 
29 Id. at 558. 
30 Id. at 562. 
31 Id. at 564. 
32 Id. at 563. 
33 Id. 
34 United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14 (1935).  
35 The Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430, 439 (1874). 
36 Id. at 433. 
37 Id. at 434. 
38 Id. at 442. 
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Court concluded that the river was a navigable waterway.
39
 It 
articulated the following test: “[T]he vital and essential point is 
whether the natural navigation of the river is such that it affords a 
channel for useful commerce. If this be so the river is navigable in 
fact, although its navigation may be encompassed with difficulties by 
reason of natural barriers.”
40
 Further, the Court concluded the mode 
by which commerce may be conducted does not matter; the river must 
simply “be capable in its natural state of being used for purposes of 
commerce.”
41
 
D.  United States v. Utah 
In United States v. Utah, the United States brought suit to quiet 
title to portions of the beds and banks of the Green, Colorado, and 
San Juan Rivers in Utah.
42
 The United States’ complaint alleged that 
the federal government acquired title to the riparian lands and 
riverbeds in Utah through the Guadalupe-Hidalgo Treaty.
43
 Utah 
contended that the State acquired title to the riverbeds upon 
admittance to the Union because the rivers were navigable at the time 
of statehood.
44
 Furthermore, Utah executed a number of oil and gas 
leases over portions of the riverbeds in question without the consent 
of the United States.
45
 
The U.S. Supreme Court referred the case to a special master to 
determine the navigability of the rivers at the time of statehood.
46
 The 
master found that certain portions of the rivers were navigable and 
passed to state ownership under the equal-footing doctrine, while 
nonnavigable portions remained the possessions of the United 
States.
47
 Both the United States and Utah filed exceptions to the 
master’s findings.
48
 
 
39 Id. at 443. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 441. 
42 United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 71 (1931). 
43 Id. at 71–72. 
44 Id. at 72. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 73. 
47 Id. at 73–74. 
48 Id. at 74. 
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On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court explicitly noted that the 
controversy concerned specific facts, not principles of law.
49
 Before 
delving into the particular facts at issue, the Court summarily 
described two applicable legal principles: first, the navigability-for-
title test from The Daniel Ball;
50
 second, the Montello Court’s 
clarification that “the true test of the navigability of a stream does not 
depend on the mode by which commerce is, or may be, conducted, 
nor the difficulties attending navigation.”
51
 The Utah Court also 
noted the recent holding in United States v. Holt State Bank in which 
the Court similarly applied The Daniel Ball and The Montello.
52
 The 
Utah Court reiterated the Holt State Bank statement that the 
navigability test concerns whether “the stream in its natural and 
ordinary condition affords a channel for useful commerce.”
53
 
Stating that each determination of navigability must be made on a 
case-by-case basis, the Utah Court analyzed the master’s findings for 
each segment in question, noting, “[t]he question here is not with 
respect to a short interruption of navigability in a stream otherwise 
navigable, or of a negligible part, which boats may use, of a stream 
otherwise nonnavigable. We are concerned with long reaches with 
particular characteristics of navigability or nonnavigability.”
54
 
While the facts before the Utah Court did not include any short or 
negligible interruptions in navigability, the Court’s language vaguely 
indicates such facts could require an alternative holding. The Utah 
Court divided the rivers into segments, determining navigability with 
respect to particular portions.
55
 The Utah Court held the first 4.35 
miles of the Colorado River in Utah to be navigable, the following 
36.15 miles through Cataract Canyon to be nonnavigable, and the 
next 149 miles to be navigable.
56
 Cataract Canyon had never been 
fully portaged; no type of boat had ever passed through the entire 
canyon, so that segment was held nonnavigable.
57
 Thus, the Utah 
Court’s language about a channel for useful commerce was forgotten 
 
49 Id. at 75. 
50 Id. at 76 (citing The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870)). 
51 Id. (citing The Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430, 441 (1874)). 
52 Id. (citing United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 56 (1926)). 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 77. This is the language used to argue both for segmentation and for the overall 
susceptibility to commerce application of the navigability-for-title test. 
55 Id. 
56 See id. at 79–80. 
57 Id. at 80. 
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in its segment-by-segment application of the Daniel Ball test and The 
Montello. 
E.  Navigability in Fact and the Ensuing Confusion 
A waterway must have been navigable in fact at the time of 
statehood to be navigable for title.
58
 The standard is often defined as 
follows: “Those rivers must be regarded as public navigable rivers in 
law which are navigable in fact.”
59
 The general term navigability may 
be used in reference to many types of legal navigability, including 
federal navigational servitude, federal navigability for regulation, 
state law navigability, and navigability for admiralty jurisdiction.
60
 
These different types of navigability have varying standards and 
applications, but the common term navigability in fact often leads 
courts to apply the wrong type of navigability precedent.
61
 
II 
NAVIGABILITY-FOR-TITLE LAW TESTED IN PPL I 
The rich history behind navigability-for-title law was tested in a 
recent decision before the U.S. Supreme Court. The controversial 
Montana Supreme Court decision in PPL I brought gaps in 
navigability law to light. Despite the significant consequences of 
navigability-for-title law, namely ownership of often very valuable 
lands, The Daniel Ball and its progeny left a burning question with 
sparse legal history to be decided: is the Daniel Ball test to be applied 
to the particular segment of the river at issue or with respect to the 
entire river’s overall susceptibility to commerce? 
In PPL I,
62
 the Montana Supreme Court upheld the Montana trial 
court’s ruling that PPL Montana, LLC (“PPL”) owed the State of 
Montana over forty million dollars for using state-owned riverbeds.
63
 
 
58 Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 472 (1892). 
59 The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870). 
60 JOSEPH L. SAX ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 525 n.10 (4th ed. 2006). 
61 PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana (PPL II), 132 S. Ct. 1215, 1235 (2012) (noting the 
Montana Supreme Court’s decision “was based upon an infirm legal understanding of this 
Court’s rules of navigability for title under the equal-footing doctrine”). 
62 The Montana Court opined on six major issues in PPL I, but this Note will only 
discuss the issue of segmentation for navigability for title. 
63 PPL Mont., LLC v. State (PPL I), 229 P.3d 421, 426 (Mont. 2010), cert. granted in 
part, 131 S. Ct. 3019 (2011), and rev’d and remanded, 132 S. Ct. 1215 (2012). 
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The Montana Supreme Court applied the Daniel Ball test to a whole 
river’s overall usefulness for commerce,
64
 in determining that the 
river was navigable-for-title purposes.
65
 
PPL is a Delaware-based corporation operated as a wholesale 
electricity generator and, as such, is exempt from state public utility 
regulations.
66
 PPL purchased hydroelectric facilities on the Clark 
Fork, Missouri, and Madison Rivers from the Montana Power 
Company.
67
 The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission licensed the 
facilities under the Federal Power Act.
68
 
In October 2003, parents of public school children sued PPL in the 
United States District Court of Montana, demanding compensation 
for the use of State riverbeds under the theory that the riverbeds were 
school trust lands.
69
 The State of Montana joined the federal suit in 
June 2004 and filed its own complaint seeking compensation from 
PPL pursuant to the school trust theory, argued by the original 
plaintiffs, and under the Hydroelectric Resources Act.
70
 The federal 
case was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but not 
before PPL filed a declaratory judgment action against the State in the 
First Judicial District Court of Montana. 
In its complaint, PPL argued that under the Hydroelectric 
Resources Act, the State’s claims were preempted by both the Federal 
Power Act and federal navigational servitude.
71
 Montana 
counterclaimed for compensation for PPL’s years of prior and 
continuing use of state lands under the Hydroelectric Resources 
Act.
72
 Montana argued that the federal government gave the State title 
to the beds and banks of the Missouri, Clark Fork, and Madison 
 
64 Id. at 446. 
65 Id. at 460–61. 
66 Id. at 426. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. The Montana Power Company had also never compensated the State for using the 
riverbeds. Id. at 427. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s authority to issue 
licenses for the construction, operation, and maintenance of dams arises from the Federal 
Power Act. 16 U.S.C.A. § 791(a) (West 2006). Additionally, the Federal Power Act 
preserves the role of state law within the federal licensing structure. Id. 
69 PPL I, 229 P.3d at 426. 
70 Id. at 427. The Hydroelectric Resources Act provides that the sale or advertisement 
for sale of state land power sites capable of creating hydroelectric power in commercial 
quantities is unlawful. MONT. CODE ANN. § 77-4-201 (2011). 
71 PPL I, 229 P.3d at 427. The federal navigational servitude is the power retained by 
the United States to keep navigable rivers open to interstate commerce. Id. 
72 Id. at 428.  
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Rivers at the time of statehood under the equal-footing doctrine.
73
 On 
cross-motions for summary judgment, the court held that the rivers 
were navigable at the time of statehood, and the State of Montana 
received title to the beds and banks of these rivers when it entered the 
Union in 1889.
74
 PPL appealed, arguing summary judgment was 
inappropriate.
75
 
On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s 
grant of summary judgment.
76
 The Montana Supreme Court reversed 
the trial court’s finding that the riverbeds were school trust lands, 
finding instead that the riverbeds were public trust lands under article 
X, section 11 of the Montana Constitution.
77
 Additionally, the 
Montana court held PPL did not receive a grant to use the state land 
when it received the right to appropriate water for hydroelectricity 
production.
78
 While the Hydroelectric Resources Act applied to 
projects on two of the rivers, the State had a constitutional and 
statutory duty to seek full market value for the use of its riverbeds.
79
 
Therefore, the Federal Power Act did not preempt the Hydroelectric 
Resources Act.
80
 
On the issue of navigability for title, the Montana Supreme Court 
held the trial court correctly interpreted Utah’s broad definition of 
navigability.
81
 The key issue was whether the rivers were susceptible 
to commerce at the time of statehood; the rivers need not have 
experienced actual use.
82
 Additionally, the navigability determination 
was not dependent on which type of vessel could navigate the river.
83
 
Portages, carrying places, and other obstructions would not 
 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 434. First, PPL presented historical documents and expert testimony disputing 
the navigability finding. Id. Second, PPL claimed the lower court misapplied precedent in 
relying on United States v. Utah. Id. at 431 (citing United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64 
(1931)). 
76 Id. at 447. 
77 Id. at 450. This section of the Montana Constitution states riverbeds are held “in trust 
for the people” and are not to “ever be disposed of except in pursuance of general laws 
providing for such disposition” or when full market value compensation is assessed and 
paid to the State. MONT. CONST. art. X, § 11. 
78 PPL I, 229 P.3d at 451. 
79 Id. at 454. 
80 Id. at 453. 
81 Id. at 447 (citing United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 83 (1931)). 
82 Id. at 446. 
83 Id. 
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necessarily defeat a finding of navigability.
84
 Accordingly, the 
existence of nonnavigable portions of a river would not defeat a 
finding of navigability for title.
85
 
The Montana Supreme Court also held that the lower court 
correctly applied the navigability-for-title law to the facts of the 
particular case.
86
 Although the Missouri and Clark Fork Rivers 
required portage, the rivers were nevertheless navigable at the time of 
statehood.
87
 The Montana Supreme Court based its decision on 
historic evidence of use, government reports of navigability, and 
current commercial activity.
88
 Relying on a diary entry from the 
Lewis and Clark journal, the Montana Supreme Court found the 
Missouri River navigable at the time of statehood, despite the 
expedition’s decision to portage around the Great Falls.
89
 
Additionally, the Court looked to evidence of nineteenth-century use 
of a log float as well as modern recreational uses to find the Madison 
River navigable at statehood.
90
 The Montana court held that PPL did 
not raise any genuine issue of material fact regarding the navigability 
of the three rivers.
91
 
The Montana court specifically limited its holding, responding to 
concerns that its judgment would affect water appropriation.
92
 
Additionally, the court noted that the State’s constitutional obligation 
to seek full market value for disposing of public trust land was limited 
to the specific facts of the case and provisions of the Hydroelectric 
Resources Act.
93
  
Justice Rice, dissenting, argued that the majority misinterpreted the 
precedent set forth in Utah and that the Montana court should have 
undertaken a section-by-section analysis of navigability.
94
 Justice 
Rice stated that PPL’s argument for particular portions of the rivers at 
issue to be declared nonnavigable was consistent with the approach of 
 
84 Id. 
85 See id. 
86 Id. at 447. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 449. 
92 Id. at 460. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 461 (Rice, J., dissenting). Justice Rice was joined by Judge Salvagni, sitting for 
the recused Justice Morris. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 15, PPL I, 229 P.3d 421 
(Mont. 2010) (No. 10-218). 
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the Utah Court.
95
 Further, Justice Rice contended that the majority 
erred in treating Utah’s section-by-section approach as an “anomaly” 
rather than a general “framework of analysis.”
96
 
Additionally, Justice Rice found it “disturbing” that the majority 
dismissed the sections of the rivers in question as too short to matter 
without providing any explanation or analysis concerning what 
constitutes a negligible segment.
97
 The majority also failed to engage 
in extensive fact-finding, unlike the Utah Court, which analyzed 
topography, history, impediments, and the use and susceptibility to 
use for commerce.
98
 Emphasizing that summary judgment was an 
“extreme remedy,” Justice Rice concluded that the majority’s 
judgment was inappropriate.
99
 
PPL successfully sought certiorari,
100
 characterizing the Montana 
Supreme Court’s holding as an unfounded state land grab.
101
 
Specifically, PPL argued that the Montana court incorrectly applied 
the navigability-for-title test to the rivers as a whole when precedent 
dictated that the test should be applied segment by segment.
102
 That 
argument was based almost entirely on the precedent set forth in 
Utah, the very same precedent relied on by the majority in PPL I. 
III 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AFTER PPL I 
On appeal, both PPL and Montana relied on Utah to argue how the 
navigability-for-title test was to be applied. Both parties also argued 
about whether the portages required by two of the rivers constituted 
negligible breaks in navigability. PPL and the State continued to 
debate which case law was binding and which was persuasive in light 
of the type of navigability at issue. 
A.  PPL’s Argument 
In its petition for writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court, PPL 
argued that the Montana court’s decision could not be squared with 
 
95 PPL I, 229 P.3d at 462. 
96 Id. at 463. 
97 Id. at 464. 
98 Id. at 470. 
99 Id. at 464. 
100 Petition, supra note 94, at 17. 
101 Id. at 1. 
102 Id. at 19. 
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the U.S. Supreme Court’s navigability precedent in Utah.
103
 PPL 
characterized Utah as establishing “bedrock principles” of applying 
navigability segment by segment, which the Montana Supreme Court 
brazenly disregarded.
104
 Further, PPL warned that PPL I would serve 
as a “roadmap” to “circumvent federal law on navigability” and 
overturn hydropower companies’ longstanding reliance on their 
perceived ownership of riverbeds and banks.
105
 
Reviewing the facts and holding of Utah, PPL read the case to 
determine that a 4.35-mile segment is sufficiently long to constitute 
more than a merely negligible river segment.
106
 However, the 
Montana court held that the much longer seventeen-mile segment was 
too short to constitute more than a negligible break in navigability.
107
 
PPL cautioned that the Montana court’s decision demonstrated how 
Utah’s negligible interruptions language could become the exception 
that swallowed the rule when misapplied.
108
 
Additionally, PPL cited United States v. Appalachian Electric 
Power Company, a Commerce Clause case, to demonstrate that 
navigability for title was to be determined on a segment-by-segment 
basis.
109
 In that case, after dividing the river at issue into three 
sections, the U.S. Supreme Court eventually held that all the relevant 
segments of the river were navigable for purposes of commerce.
110
 
Based on this precedent, PPL argued that the Montana court erred 
because “[c]ourts should not assume that certain sections of a river 
are navigable or non-navigable merely because the river taken as a 
whole may be characterized as generally navigable or non-
navigable.”
111
 
PPL’s petition also defined the dividing line amid nonbinding 
precedent in the segment-by-segment versus river-as-a-whole 
application of the navigability-for-title test.
112
 Many state and federal 
 
103 Id. at 17. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 18. 
106 Id. at 22–23. 
107 Id. at 23. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 21 (citing United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 
(1940)). 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 24. 
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courts applied the navigability-for-title test segment by segment.
113
 
However, some courts applied the test to the river as a whole; those 
courts were primarily state courts.
114
 PPL suggested this division 
reflected “the temptation for state courts to err on the side of the 
states.”
115
 
In the Reply Brief for Petitioner, PPL accused Montana of 
conflating the “long-settled” distinction between navigability for 
commerce and navigability for title.
116
 PPL conceded that some 
segments of the river were navigable for commerce purposes, and as 
such, subject to federal regulation.
117
 However, PPL vehemently 
denied it ever conceded any of the relevant stretches were navigable 
for title.
118
 PPL further argued that Montana conflated the different 
tests for navigability in claiming certain cases discussing federal 
regulatory navigability were binding on the present navigability-for-
title issue.
119
 Therefore, PPL contended that even if the federal 
regulatory cases Montana cited were relevant, they would not support 
a finding of navigability for title.
120
 
B.  The State of Montana’s Argument 
In contrast, the State argued that The Montello indicated 
navigability determinations depended on a river’s actual use or 
susceptibility to use as a channel for commerce.
121
 In its brief to the 
U.S. Supreme Court, the State argued that Utah did not support the 
 
113 Id. (citing Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 993 F.2d 
1428, 1432–33 (9th Cir. 1993); City of Centralia v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 851 
F.2d 278, 279–80 (9th Cir. 1988); Loving v. Alexander, 745 F.2d 861, 867 (4th Cir. 1984); 
Utah v. United States, 304 F.2d 23, 26 (10th Cir. 1962); Nw. Steelheaders Ass’n v. 
Simantel, 112 P.3d 383, 395 (Or. Ct. App. 2005)). 
114 Id. at 24–25 (citing Nw. La. Fish & Game Preserve Comm’n v. United States, 574 
F.3d 1386, 1391 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Bauman v. Woodlake Partners, LLC, 681 S.E.2d 819, 
827 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009); Ryals v. Pigott, 580 So. 2d 1140, 1152 (Miss. 1991); Mont. 
Coal. for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 166 (Mont. 1984)). 
115 Id. at 24. 
116 Reply Brief for Petitioner at 3, PPL Mont., LLC v. State (PPL I), 229 P.3d 421 
(Mont. 2010) (No. 10-218). 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. at 4 (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 171 (1979) (“[A]ny 
reliance upon judicial precedent must be predicated upon careful appraisal of the purpose 
for which the concept of ‘navigability’ was invoked in a particular case.”)).  
120 Id. 
121 Brief for Respondent at 19, PPL Mont., LLC v. State (PPL I), 229 P.3d 421 (Mont. 
2010) (No. 10-218). 
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segment-by-segment approach.
122
 Montana summarized the law set 
forth in Utah by emphasizing the need for a case-by-case analysis of 
navigability on particular facts.
123
 
Montana contended that the canyon in Utah was never fully 
portaged “so the highway of commerce came to a dead end at the 
canyon.”
124
 But the Great Falls presented a mere difficulty in 
navigation requiring portage.
125
 Thus, evidence of the need to portage 
around the Great Falls, as detailed in the Lewis and Clark journal, did 
not defeat a finding of navigability in fact.
126
 The State argued that in 
relying on The Montello, Utah stood for the rule that short, 
portageable interruptions in navigability do not defeat a finding of 
navigability in fact.
127
 
Additionally, Montana called attention to the absence of a 
definition of “negligible” interruption in navigability.
128
 The absence 
of this definition was especially worrisome because it could 
potentially invite litigation by riparian owners seeking to isolate “non-
navigable” parts of the river.
129
 Montana’s brief recalled The 
Montello’s language to argue that the key question was whether the 
river served as a continuous highway of commerce and not the 
particular length of a nonnavigable segment.
130
 The Lewis and Clark 
expedition, among others, successfully portaged around the Great 
Falls.
131
 Thus, the river served as a useful channel for commerce 
despite difficulties in navigation.
132
 If the law allowed a 
determination of navigability in fact to be defeated by a stretch of 
 
122 Id. at 22. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. at 34–35. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. at 22. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 21. Earlier in the brief, Montana noted that from the time of statehood, “it has 
been generally recognized that the riverbeds at issue belong to the people of Montana in 
public trust, and not private riparian owners.” Id. at 5. Upon admission into the Union, a 
state receives title to the land underlying its navigable waterways and may either hold title 
to the lands in trust for the benefit of the people or grant title to private riparian owners. In 
this case, Montana clearly claimed that the State retained title. Therefore, this particular 
concern about litigation from private landowners does not seem applicable to Montana 
(but perhaps would be of concern to states that had granted title to private riparian 
landowners). 
130 Id. at 20. 
131 Id. at 9 (citing 4 THE JOURNALS OF THE LEWIS & CLARK EXPEDITION 284 (Gary E. 
Moulton ed., Univ. of Neb. Press 1987)). 
132 Id. at 2. 
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nonnavigable water, navigability for title would be a defunct 
principle; rivers of the United States are simply too wild.
133
 
Additionally, Montana responded to PPL’s contention that The 
Montello did not apply because it was not a title navigability case.
134
 
Montana argued that because the Montello Court applied the Daniel 
Ball test, The Montello is relevant case law on the subject of how to 
apply the Daniel Ball test.
135
 Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court 
has repeatedly relied on both The Daniel Ball and The Montello when 
discussing the test for navigability for title for over 140 years.
136
 
Montana explained that the Court adopted The Daniel Ball and The 
Montello’s test for navigability in three contexts: (1) regulatory cases 
involving a river’s natural condition, (2) title cases concerning 
navigability at the time of statehood, and (3) title cases analyzing 
whether the river was a part of a useful channel for commerce.
137
 
Therefore, Montana contended that regulatory navigability cases 
informed navigability-for-title cases where the tests overlapped.
138
 
Abruptly ending the Court’s long history of relying on nontitle 
navigability cases as precedent would upset principles of stare 
decisis.
139
 Montana argued that going forward, the Court must 
continue to rely on relevant nontitle navigability cases such as The 
Montello.
140
 Therefore, the key navigability-for-title question, 
according to Montana, was whether the river served as a useful 
channel for commerce.
141
 
IV 
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT’S OPINION IN PPL II 
Justice Kennedy delivered the unanimous opinion for the U.S. 
Supreme Court shortly after the hearing on December 7, 2011. The 
Court reversed the Montana Supreme Court’s grant of title to 
 
133 See id. at 22. 
134 Id. at 30. 
135 Id. (citing The Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430, 439 (1874)). 
136 Id. at 30–31 (citing United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 15 (1935); United States v. 
Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 76, 83 (1931); United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 56 
(1926); Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574, 586 (1922); Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. 
United States, 260 U.S. 77, 86 (1922); Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661, 667 (1891)). 
137 Id. at 31. 
138 Id. at 31–32. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. at 31. 
141 See id. at 2. 
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Montana and the award of forty-one million dollars in rent for the 
riverbeds between 2000 and 2007 and remanded on the issue of 
whether the particular segments were navigable.
142
 As for the issue of 
how to apply the Daniel Ball test, the Court decisively held that the 
test is to be applied segment by segment.
143
 
A.  Justification for the Segment-by-Segment Approach 
In addressing navigability in fact, Justice Kennedy first quoted the 
five-element test from The Daniel Ball.
144
 Previous courts similarly 
relied on The Daniel Ball in determinations concerning federal 
regulatory authority under the Constitution, federal statutory 
navigability, and title to land beneath navigable waterways under the 
equal-footing doctrine.
145
 However, Justice Kennedy noted, “the test 
for navigability is not applied in the same way” and varies according 
to the type of navigability at issue.
146
 
Refreshingly, the Court takes the time to point out several of the 
differences in the long-muddled application of navigability.
147
 
Federal commerce power navigability cases such as The Daniel Ball 
historically concentrated on interstate commerce.
148
 The Court 
contrasted federal commerce power navigability analysis with that of 
navigability for title.
149
 A court’s navigability-for-title determination 
is independent from whether navigation is for interstate travel.
150
 
Each application of the Daniel Ball test will likely reveal additional 
variations.
151
 While applying the Daniel Ball test, the U.S. Supreme 
Court noted that the navigability-for-title question is distinct from the 
Daniel Ball case. Thus, the Court applied the Daniel Ball test but 
without the emphasis on interstate commerce. 
The U.S. Supreme Court held that determinations of navigability 
for title are decided on a segment-by-segment basis.
152
 The Court 
based this rule on the following language from Utah: “Even where the 
 
142 PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana (PPL II), 132 S. Ct. 1215, 1233 (2012). 
143 Id. at 1228. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. at 1228–29. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. at 1229. 
150 Id. 
151 Id. 
152 Id. 
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navigability of a river . . . is a matter of common knowledge, and 
hence one of which judicial notice may be taken, it may yet be a 
question, to be determined upon evidence, how far navigability 
extends.”
153
 Additionally, the Court read the Utah Court’s factual 
determinations to support the segment-by-segment approach.
154
 
Furthermore, the Court relied on Brewer-Elliott Oil and Gas 
Company v. United States, a case not cited by either party or the 
Montana Supreme Court in PPL I, as precedent for segmentation.
155
 
The Brewer-Elliott Court held that the segments in question were not 
navigable in fact and title did not pass to the State even though 
another stretch of the river was navigable.
156
 This case further 
demonstrated that the “segment-by-segment approach to navigability 
for title is well settled, and it should not be disregarded.”
157
 
The Court explained that the segment-by-segment approach was 
supported not only by precedent but also by the underlying practical 
justification for sovereign ownership of land under navigable 
waterways.
158
 Sovereign ownership of the beds and banks of 
navigable waterways protects against private owners interfering with 
the public right to use navigable waterways as highways for 
commerce.
159
 Commerce is not possible over nonnavigable segments, 
so “there is no reason that these segments also should be deemed 
owned by the State under the equal-footing doctrine.”
160
 
Further, the Court justified the segment-by-segment application of 
the Daniel Ball test by taking practical considerations into account.
161
 
One practical consideration is the physical conditions affecting 
navigability.
162
 Long rivers run through varying terrain, causing the 
flow of the rivers to fluctuate.
163
 Such fluctuations can be used to 
divide the river into distinct portions for the segment-by-segment 
 
153 Id. (citing United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 77 (1931)). 
154 Id. at 1220. 
155 Id. at 1229 (citing Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77, 85 
(1922)). 
156 Id. at 1230. 
157 Id. at 1229. 
158 Id. at 1229–30. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. at 1230. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. 
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approach.
164
 A further practical consideration favoring the segment-
by-segment approach is consistency.
165
 Private landowners gain title 
to riverbeds segment by segment, which demonstrates the division 
method is administrable.
166
 Maintaining a similar approach to 
allocation under the equal-footing doctrine promotes consistent 
treatment of private and sovereign landowners.
167
 
B.  Short Interruptions in Navigability 
PPL II decisively stated that even if the river segments in question 
constituted short interruptions in navigability, the segment-by-
segment application of the Daniel Ball test remains appropriate.
168
 
Interpreting the language from Utah, Justice Kennedy noted that there 
could be nonnavigable river segments so short that they merit 
treatment as part of a long, navigable segment.
169
 This application 
supports administrability and prevents the creation of worthless 
segments.
170
 However, a court would err by comparing a 
nonnavigable segment’s length to the overall length of the river; such 
a comparison “would be simply irrelevant,” because the test is not 
determined by the navigability of particular segments.
171
 The 
segments at issue were “discrete” and “substantial,” and thus Justice 
Kennedy refrained from delineating how short a nonnavigable 
segment must be to be negligible.
172
 
The need to portage, while demonstrating an interruption in 
navigability, does not constitute a mere short interruption in 
navigability “[i]n most cases.”
173
 While the boundaries are hazy, 
Justice Kennedy dictated that even the need to portage for one day 
would defeat navigability.
174
 Justice Kennedy continued by noting 
 
164 Id. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. “Even if the law might find some nonnavigable segments so minimal that they 
merit treatment as part of a longer, navigable reach for purposes of title under the equal-
footing doctrine . . . the Great Falls reach—certainly would not.” Id. The Court went on to 
note, “the State sought and was awarded rent in the amount of $41 million for PPL’s 
various hydroelectric facilities attached to the riverbeds, half of which are along the Great 
Falls reach.” Id. at 1231. 
171  Id. 
172  Id.  
173  Id. 
174  Id. 
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that “the Great Falls reach [] certainly would not” meet the negligible 
segment exception.
175
 
PPL II also concluded that the Montana court erred in relying on 
The Montello in determining how to apply the navigability-for-title 
test.
176
 Citing the Daniel Ball test, the Montello Court addressed 
whether a river was a navigable waterway of the United States by 
determining whether a river “forms by itself, or by its connection with 
other waters, a continued highway over which commerce is, or may 
be, carried with other States or foreign countries in the customary 
modes in which such commerce is conducted by water.” 
177
 Justice 
Kennedy cited and relied on this language in PPL II.
178
 However, 
Justice Kennedy concluded that the analysis for portages in deciding 
The Montello did not apply to the title issue before the Court.
179
 Thus, 
Justice Kennedy noted that a nonnavigable river segment or portage 
could be so short as not to defeat navigability, but the likelihood of 
such a finding is limited.
180
 
V 
RETHINKING PPL II 
PPL II clarifies a body of law plagued by conflated terms and split 
authority. The U.S. Supreme Court decisively held that the 
navigability-for-title test is to be applied segment by segment and not 
to a river’s overall susceptibility to commerce. Considering the value 
of many of the contested lands underlying navigable waterways, the 
clarification was long overdue. Additionally, this clarification 
provides for better predictability of title disputes in the future. 
Nevertheless, the law concerning the application of the 
navigability-for-title test was not as “well settled” as the Supreme 
Court claimed. After all, the Court saw fit to grant certiorari on the 
issue. Furthermore, the lower courts—and even the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s own prior decisions—exemplify the split between segment-
by-segment and overall-susceptibility-to-commerce applications of 
 
175  Id. at 1230. PPL II’s holding is a remand, but Justice Kennedy’s statement about 
how the Great Falls “certainly would not” meet the exception sounds like a reversal. 
176  Id. at 1231. 
177  The Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430, 439 (1874) (citing The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 
(10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870)). 
178  PPL II, 132 S. Ct. at 1231 (citing The Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 439).  
179  Id.  
180  Id. at 1230. 
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the Daniel Ball test. While Justice Kennedy penned a thorough 
opinion, three matters in particular require additional clarification. 
A.  Ambiguity in Utah 
First, PPL II oversimplified the incredibly unclear precedent set in 
Utah. While the factual holdings support the inference that The 
Daniel Ball is to be applied segment by segment, the Utah Court’s 
language suggests that the navigability-for-title test is to be 
determined with respect to the river’s overall susceptibility to 
commerce. Both PPL and Montana made persuasive arguments 
supporting their preferred method of applying the navigability-for-
title test based on Utah, but the PPL II Court ignored Utah’s ample 
language about susceptibility to commerce. 
Utah could also be read as supporting neither method suggested by 
the parties in PPL II, but rather a flexible balancing test. The Utah 
opinion accounted for a number of issues including portages, 
susceptibility to commerce, history of use, and the length of 
nonnavigable stretches. The Court in Utah held one segment of the 
river navigable, the next nonnavigable, and the following navigable. 
The segments were analyzed as much as individual segments as they 
were based on how each affected the river’s overall susceptibility to 
commerce. The Utah Court reasoned that the middle segment was 
nonnavigable because it could not be portaged around. Further, 
nonnavigability need not defeat a finding of navigability if the stretch 
is merely negligible. The determinative factor in finding the segment 
nonnavigable was that it could not be portaged around and thus could 
not serve as a useful channel for commerce. Balancing tests are 
characteristically unpredictable, but PPL II’s method would require 
rivers to be segmented in a way that denies the natural flow of the 
ecosystems and rivers themselves. 
By definitively citing Utah as standing for a segment-by-segment 
application of the navigability-for-title test, the Court bordered on 
misreading the case. Utah can be reasonably read as supporting an 
overall-susceptibility-to-commerce application. At a minimum, Utah 
required a thorough analysis before being summarily cited as 
supporting a segment-by-segment application of The Daniel Ball and 
not an overall-susceptibility-to-commerce application. 
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B.  Practical Considerations 
PPL II’s practical justifications for the segment-by-segment 
approach are less than persuasive. For instance, the historical 
rationale for giving lands beneath navigable waters to the state in 
order to better maintain the navigability of the overlying waters is no 
longer relevant. The concern is that if the land was privately held, 
owners could create structures that interfere with navigability. The 
federal navigational servitude now adequately protects this interest.
181
 Similarly, the Court’s claim that the physical attributes of rivers 
support a segment-by-segment application of the Daniel Ball test falls 
short of persuasiveness. Justice Kennedy suggested that a river’s 
physical variations make the segment-by-segment approach easy to 
administer. However, what one considers a physically distinct 
segment will often vary. While certainly there will occasionally be 
clearly distinct segments, such as Cataract Canyon in Utah, most 
distinctions will be highly subjective. The physical attributes of rivers 
are important and the law should acknowledge such natural 
distinctions. Nevertheless, these physical attributes are often 
insufficiently distinctive to justify a segment-by-segment application 
of the Daniel Ball test. 
The final justification, to promote consistency by applying the 
navigability-for-title test segment by segment, is also unconvincing. 
While the private title allocation process uses a segment-by-segment 
approach, the purpose differs from navigability determinations. 
Navigability for title originates from the equal-footing doctrine, 
which was created to ensure that new states entered the Union with 
similar rights as the original colonies. This is a distinct purpose in 
comparison to the purposes behind acquiring private property. There 
is no need for consistency between these discrete title issues; states 
and private landowners need not be treated the same. 
C.  Overlooking The Montello 
The PPL II Court treated precedent inconsistently, sometimes 
dismissing and sometimes adopting precedent concerning other 
navigability issues. The Supreme Court found Utah and not The 
 
181 Federal navigable servitude arises from the Commerce Clause in the U.S. 
Constitution and gives the federal government the right to regulate navigable waterways, 
even by taking private property without providing compensation. United States v. Rands, 
389 U.S. 121, 122–23 (1967). 
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Montello relevant precedent. The Montello is not a navigability-for-
title case, but the Utah Court relied on The Montello to interpret the 
Daniel Ball test. While navigability law is conflated and requires 
clarification, The Montello is still relevant to interpreting the Daniel 
Ball test. 
PPL II stretched logic in finding The Montello inapplicable. The 
PPL II Court cited a sentence from The Montello concerning waters 
over which commerce is conducted as an example of what is not 
navigability-for-title law. However, this language originated in the 
Daniel Ball test. The language of the Daniel Ball test and The 
Montello’s interpretation of that language suggest that the test is to be 
applied to a river’s overall susceptibility to commerce. The Court did 
not adequately distinguish this contrary precedent. 
PPL II adopted some law from the Commerce Clause cases while 
omitting others as not based on navigability-for-title law. Like The 
Montello, The Daniel Ball concerns navigability issues other than 
navigability for title. The PPL II Court properly emphasized the 
importance of not conflating different navigability tests. PPL II 
adopted the five-element test from The Daniel Ball but not language 
articulating the key inquiry of whether the river served as a highway 
for commerce. The Court failed to explain why some concepts in a 
nontitle navigability case were relevant while other concepts within 
the same case were not. 
CONCLUSION 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in PPL II clarified a long-
muddled area of law. Explaining the framework and background of 
navigability for title, the Court eloquently elucidated nuances 
surrounding the Daniel Ball test. The Montana Supreme Court’s 
decision and parties’ briefs demonstrate that the application of the test 
was not as well-settled as the Supreme Court suggested. In its 
holding, the Supreme Court oversimplified precedent, stretched for 
nonlegal justifications, and overlooked a relevant body of law. 
However, the holding is decisive; the test for navigability in fact is to 
be applied segment by segment. 
While Justice Kennedy’s language is clear, the exception for 
negligible segments remains. PPL II emphasized the rareness of 
finding negligible segments so short as to merit treatment as part of a 
longer segment. As PPL contended in its writ for certiorari, the 
negligible segments exception could swallow the rule. Because PPL 
and most hydropower companies locate facilities on the turbid 
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segments of rivers, future litigation is imminent. Both states and the 
federal government have incentives to argue zealously for favorable 
navigability determinations in light of the vast amounts of rent money 
potentially owed by hydropower companies. The State of Montana 
did not sue for back rent, but such a claim would not be unjustified. If 
the title owner could collect back rent in addition to future rent, the 
financial implications of navigability-for-title determinations would 
be immense. Therefore, courts will soon be pressed to define what 
precisely constitutes a negligible segment. 
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